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Protecting Patient Privacy in Genomic Analysis
Abstract
Patient genomes are interpretable only in the context of other genomes. However, privacy concerns over
genetic data oftentimes deter individuals from contributing their genomes to scientific studies and prevent
researchers from sharing their data with the scientific community. In this talk, I will describe how we can
leverage secure multiparty computation techniques from modern cryptography to perform useful scientific
computations on genomic data while protecting the privacy of the participants' genomes. In multiple real
scenarios, our methods successfully identified the disease-causing genes and even discovered previously
unrecognized disease genes, all while keeping nearly all of the participants' most sensitive genomic
information private. We believe that our techniques will help make currently restricted data more readily
available to the scientific community and enable individuals to contribute their genomes to a study without
compromising their personal privacy.
The material from this talk is based on joint works with Gill Bejerano, Bonnie Berger, Johannes A. Birgmeier,
Dan Boneh, Hyunghoon Cho, and Karthik A. Jagadeesh.
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The Era of “Big Data”
analytics, 
recommendations
Data Collection and Data Breaches
Database breaches have 
become the norm rather 
than the exception…
[Data taken from Vigilante.pw]
Genomics in the Era of Big Data
Source: Nature, 2014
Genome sequencing 
around $1000!
Genomics in the Era of Big Data
Privacy-Preserving Genomics
Finding a tradeoff between functionality and privacy
Rare Disease Diagnosis
Patients with Kabuki Syndrome
Each patient has a list of 200-400
rare variants over ≈20,000 genes
What gene causes a specific (rare) disease?
Jagadeesh-W-Birgmeier-Boneh-Bejerano [Science 2017]
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Works well for Mendelian 
(monogenic) diseases (estimated 
to affect ≈10% of individuals)
Each patient has a vector "
where "# = 1 if patient has 
a rare variant in gene &
Goal: Identify gene with 
most variants across all 
patients
Jagadeesh-W-Birgmeier-Boneh-Bejerano [Science 2017]
Patients often in
geographically-diverse locations
Rare Disease Diagnosis
Jagadeesh-W-Birgmeier-Boneh-Bejerano [Science 2017]
Trusted 
Party
Question: Can we perform this 
computation without seeing 
complete patient genomes?
Rare Disease Diagnosis
Patients with Kabuki Syndrome
Each patient has a list of 200-400
rare variants over ≈20,000 genes
Patients “secret share” 
their data with two
non-colluding hospitals
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MPC Protocol
Patients “secret share” 
their data with two
non-colluding hospitals
Hospitals run a multiparty 
computation (MPC) 
protocol on pooled inputs
Jagadeesh-W-Birgmeier-Boneh-Bejerano [Science 2017]
Rare Disease Diagnosis
Patients with Kabuki Syndrome
Each patient has a list of 200-400
rare variants over ≈20,000 genes
MPC Protocol
Top variants (sorted):
KMT2D, COL6A1, FLNB
Known cause of disease
Jagadeesh-W-Birgmeier-Boneh-Bejerano [Science 2017]
Rare Disease Diagnosis
Patients with Kabuki Syndrome
Each patient has a list of 200-400
rare variants over ≈20,000 genes
MPC Protocol
Top variants (sorted):
KMT2D, COL6A1, FLNB
Other variants that the 
patients possess are kept 
hidden
Jagadeesh-W-Birgmeier-Boneh-Bejerano [Science 2017]
End-to-End Time Communication
Number of Patients
10 10050
9.6 s
13.7 s
15.8 s
41.0 MB
62.2 MB
72.7 MB
Rare Disease Diagnosis
Jagadeesh-W-Birgmeier-Boneh-Bejerano [Science 2017]
Experimental benchmarks for identifying causal gene in small disease cohort
• Simulated two non-colluding entities with 1 server on East Coast and 1 on West Coast
Secure Genome Computation
MPC Protocol
Modern cryptographic tools enable useful computations while 
protecting the privacy of individual genomes
Secure Genome Computation
MPC Protocol
Modern cryptographic tools enable useful computations while 
protecting the privacy of individual genomes
Techniques apply to general
computations over private data
Conclusions
Project Website:
https://crypto.stanford.edu/~dwu4/genomepriv-project.html
Thank you!
• Privacy and functionality are not
inherently incompatible
• Modern cryptographic tools enable 
computation on private data
• Question: What privacy challenges 
are there in your area, and what 
kind of cryptographic tools can we 
use to address them?
